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JUVENILE GUNSLINGERS: A PLACE
FOR PUNITIVE PHILOSOPHY IN
REHABILITATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1944, we worried about our kids. We worried that they might
go truant, that they might lie to us; we hoped our sons weren't the bad
apples talking out of turn and cutting in line.' In 1994, we still worry
about our kids. We worry about pregnancy, about drugs, about whether
our youngsters will be knifed or shot on the way home from school.'
We worry that they might be the ones pulling the trigger. Worse yet,
we worry that the gun might be pointed in our direction.'
The number of juveniles arrested for murder in 1992 was more
than double the number in 1984. 4 In the vast majority of those cases,
firearms were the weapons used, most of them handguns. 5
 Moreover,
the youth gun culture continues to grow." Although this violent trend
manifests itself in our schools and on our streets, many commentators
express skepticism that the juvenile justice system is, or will he, effective
in curbing the terror and tragedy.' Unquestionably, we are scared, and
we want somebody to do something.'
I See generally Thomas Toch, et al., When Killers Come to Class: Violence in Schools, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Nov. 8, 1993 (includes survey of how times have changed between 1940 and 1990
according to public school teachers).
2 Id
3 Id




 David Barstow, Gun Ban Won't End the Violence, Sr. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 31, 1993,
Tampa Bay and State, at 1B. Of 2,508 youths questioned in a survey or ten- 10 nineteen-year-olds
in schools across the country, fifteen percent said they had carried a handgun in the past mond],
time percent said they had shot a gun at someone, and two-thirds said they could get a gun if
they wanted one. Id.
7 See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some Observations on a Recent Trend,
10 INT'L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 129, 136 (1987); Barstow, supra note 6, at III; Diedtra Henderson,
Youth-Violence Debate Strikes an Emotional Nerve-State Panel Hears flours of Diveese Mammy,
SEATELE Jan. 7, 1994, at B3; R.G, Ratcliffe, Targeting Grime; Bush Finds a Soft Spot in Record
of Richards, HousTpm CHRON., Nov. 14, 1993, (State) at 1.
8 See, e.g., 139 CONG. Rec. 514,938 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lott from
Mississippi); Gregory J. Skihinski & Ann M. Koszuth, Getting Tough with Juvenile Offenders:
Ignoring the Best Interests of the Child, 37 Juv. & PAM. Cr. J. No. 5 1986, at 43, 48; Tony Freeman de,
Gun Control: New Arguments Are Finding Their Targets as Effort to Limit Arms, Ammo Gains
Momentum, HousToN CHRON., Dee. 5, 1993, at Al (Dr. James Wright, one of the country's
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Politicians have been responding.' The public outcry for action
has been met by a recent wave of legislation aimed at curbing youth
violence."' Twenty-one states now have laws prohibiting juveniles from
possessing firearms, 1 ' and several states have provided for tough juve-
nile punishments.' 2
 Indeed, this reaction is representative of the con-
temporary trend toward a punitive juvenile justice philosophy.'s As the
violence grows, our fear grows with it, and we become increasingly
prone, when faced with young, violent offenders, to disregard the
vulnerable nature of children still responsive to our counsel." It is our
obligation, however, to distinguish between hardened youth offenders
and those who may require only a solemn reminder of what the law
demands, and to develop juvenile codes which appropriately effect this
distinctioni 5
This Note provides an overview of the recent wave of legislative
bans on juvenile firearm possession and argues that these measures, if
properly conceived, are appropriate in the tradition of our rehabilita-
tive juvenile justice scheme.' 6
 Section II examines the history of the
juvenile justice system in America." Specifically, it explains the reha-
bilitative tradition of that system and the contemporary infusion of
notions of responsibility and accountability.' 8
 Section III discusses the
authorities on guns and criminals, asserts that the climate for gun control is more favorable now
than ever before in American history); Clifford Krauss, Ban on Gun Sales to Minors Passes Senate
Easily, N.Y. To.ms, Nov. 10, 1993, at Al (99 to 1 vote to enact juvenile handgun possession ban
in Senate was affirmation of growing fears of juvenile violence); Patrick May, Disarming the Kids:
Tragedies Spur Colorado Crackdown on Handguns, MIAMI FIERAt.n, Sept. 19, 1993, at IA (Florida
citizens are scared and want something done).
9 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 7, at B3; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Scared to Death: The Stales
are Taking Initiative, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, ,Jan. 2, 1994, at 11; Sonya Vann, Phelan Asks
Referendum on Youths Having Guns, CI IICAGO TRIG., Dec. 20, 1993, (Chicagoland) at N3; Ratcliffe,
supra note 7, at 1.
I° See infra note 159 and accompanying text
" See infra Table.
12 See infra notes 190-230 and accompanying text.
I 3 See infra notes 240-81 and accompanying text for an analysis of the recent reactions to
juvenile gun possession and their implications regarding a more punitive philosophy of juvenile
justice.
14 See SANFORD J. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS 19 (3d ed. 1984). Professor Fox suggests, for
example, that proposals for turning the juvenile court into a mini-criminal court are unwise, in
that for the majority of the children being treated within the juvenile justice system a punitive
approach is improper. ld.
15
 Sec Section V.B. for a discussion of this distinction in the context of the juvenile gun
possession prohibitions.
16
 See infra notes 156-296 and accompanying text for a discussion and analysis of juvenile
gun ban legislation.
17 See infra notes 23-123 and accompanying text
181d.
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nexus between a recent, perceived surge in juvenile violence, and an
increasingly punitive approach to juvenile justice. 19 Section IV provides
an overview of state legislative reactions to the particularly fearsome
gun culture growing among America's youth, and outlines the state
bans on juvenile gun possession as a specific response to the problem
of curbing the juvenile demand for firearms. 2° Section V demonstrates
the punitive tendencies of these statutes as manifestations of a punitive
trend in juvenile justice philosophy, and assesses the utility and desir-
ability of their approaches. 21 This Note concludes that statutes provid-
ing mandatory penalties for gun possession by youths may represent
an appropriate means by which to curb the growth of the youth gun
culture, but only if they are circumspectly balanced to address the
distinction between serious juvenile offenders, whose disposition may
be justifiably driven by society's concerns for public safety, and less
troubled youths, whose needs for rehabilitation are paramount. 22
II. CHANGING ATTITUDES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Throughout history, children have been subjected to, and in a
sense, casualties of, a world created by adults and for adults; a world
which they are often unable to comprehend, and in which they are
profoundly ill-equipped to defend themselves. 23 The traditional legal
disposition of delinquent24 youths has been illustrative of this, yet only
recently has our society acted upon the notion that we owe children a
duty of protection beyond that which our legal system affords adult
offenders. 25 To fulfill that duty, states founded the juvenile courts and
19 See infra notes 124-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of juvenile violence as the
precipitator of public fear leading to an increased acceptance of punitive approaches to deter
juvenile crime.
20 See infra notes 156-230 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state enactments
and federal proposals aimed toward keeping firearms out of the hands of juveniles.
21 See infra notes 231-96 and accompanying text for an analysis of the recent wave of juvenile
firearm possession bans and their implications on the future of juvenile justice in this country.
22 Id.
"See BARRY KRISISERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE: JUSTICE 8, 8-15 (1993).
Barry Krisberg, Ph.D., is President of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency ("NCCD"),
and James F, Austin, Ph.D., is Executive Vice President for the NCCD. Id. at 211, 212.
24 By common definition, a finding of "delinquency" arises when a child violates a criminal
law. Fox, supra note 14, at 37. However, a youth may also he found delinquent for violating laws
which apply only to children. id at 40.
2r Judge Romae T. Powell, Disposition Concepts, 34juv, & Reim. Cr. J. No. 2 1983, at 1, 1. Prior
to the nineteenth century, juvenile offenders in most legal systems were processed through the
court system used for adults. Gardner, supra note 7, at 129. The first juvenile court was opened
in 1899 in Illinois. Id. at 131). By 1945, every United Slates jurisdiction as well as most European
nations had created alternatives to the adult criminal process for juveniles. Id.
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empowered them as parens patriae," responsible for providing way-
ward youths with the conscientious guidance necessary to divert them
from the path of temptation.27
 Unlike the criminal court system, which
seeks to deter crime in large measure by punishing criminals, the
juvenile courts have long been grounded upon a philosophy empha-
sizing the social rehabilitation of young offenders." The first part of
this section explores the philosophy of rehabilitation as it was under-
stood prior to the establishment of the juvenile court in the United
St2tes. 29
 The second part explores the difficulties experienced by the
juvenile court in delivering on its promise of rehabilitation, and its
reevaluation by the United States Supreme Court and by society as a
whole.3')
A. The Roots of Juvenile justice and the Rehabilitative Ideal
The history of the treatment of delinquent juveniles prior to the
establishment of juvenile courts clearly illustrates the goals of rehabili-
tative theory. 3 ' The first institutions established to control juvenile
delinquency in the United States were the Houses of Refuge, which
began in 1825 as a by-product of the economic and social dislocations
of the industrial revolution. 32
 The underlying goal of these institutions
was preventive, seeking less to punish and more to educate and train
youths, mentally and morally preparing them for a productive role in
society upon their release. 33
 When youths reached the age of legal
2c'Tlie parens patriae premise of the court ssas expressed in 1839, in Ex pane Crouse, which
used the expression to characterize the court as the "common guardian" of the children who
come before them, long before the establishment ofjuvenile courts. See 4 Wham 9,11 (Pa. 1839).
Of parens pahiae, the United States Supreme Court later remarked, "[t]he Latin phrase proved
to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the
constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,16 (1967).
27 Gault, 387 U.S. at 16.
28 See infra notes 31-56 and accompanying text.
29 Id.
3° See infra notes 57-123 and accompanying text.
31
 See generally Krisberg, supra note 23, at 8-32 (providing an exegesis of the motivations and
practices of early activists and organizations directed at the prevention of juvenile delinquency
in the United States).
32
 Krisberg, supra note 23, at 14-17. In the spirit of prevention, these early institutions
accepted children who were delinquent, dependent or neglected. This is a practice still observed
by most contemporary juvenile systems. M at 17.
" Id. at 17. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressed in 1838, "[t]lie object of the charity
is reformation, by training its inmates to industry; by imbuing their minds with principles of
morality and religion; by fiarnishing them with means to earn a living; and, above all, by separating
them from the corrupting influence of improper associates." Crouse, 4 Wham at 9.
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majority, their benefactors released them to apprenticeships where
they could practice the trades they learned in the Houses of Refuge."
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, a new wave of reform-
ers, referred to historically as the "Child Savers," also rejected notions
of punishment for punishment's sake, and brought new inspiration to
the methods employed to reform children on the road to criminality."
These reformers sought solutions for deterring deviancy which would
be both more effective than mere institutionalization, and able to
reach more children than the long-term institutionalized system of the
Houses of Refuge." One such solution, which involved placing delin-
quent youths with farming families on the western frontier, reflected
a belief that providing children with moral, compassionate and hard-
working role models would lead the youths to a productive future, a
result unattainable by mere punishment alone.'? Yet delinquency con-
tinued to rise, precipitated by massive changes in America's industrial
and social structures, underscoring the imminent need kw a perma-
nent and comprehensive system for the treatment of wayward youths."
The juvenile court emerged amidst the social turmoil of the Pro-
gressive Era." The rapid industrialization of America in the late 1800s,
coupled with overwhelming immigration into the major industrial
centers and the resultant growth of the poor, urban working class,
heightened the concern of social reformers. 4° Faced with the public's
newly acquired faith that there must be scientific explanations to per-
plexing social problems, social reformers found themselves pitted
against social Darwinists, who believed that attempting rehabilitation
of an individual is tantamount to fighting the natural process of selec-
tion itself.41 The drastic social upheavals of the Progressive Era, how-
ever, led many to doubt the wisdom of a laissez-faire approach; the
Krisherg, supra note 23, at 20.
55 See id. at. 21.
*I id .
37 See id. at 21-22. Among the criticisms of such programs was that the organizers neither
followed-up with the children they sent west, nor administered strict measures of discipline for
those who might benefit from it. hi. at 23.
" See id. at 27-29.
" Krisberg, supra note 23, at 27. Historians typically refer to the period from 1880 to 1920
as the Progressive Era. Id
10 /d. at 27. The authors suggest that the concerns thr refOrtn were driven in significant part
by the concern of the reformers, as members of the social elite, that a revolt of the poor urban
masses would effect a detrimental change in the economic and racial privileges to which they
were accustomed. Id. at 27,29.
41 Id. at 27. The opposition faced by reformers was essentially grounded in skepticism
regarding society's ability to rehabilitate a person prone to crime; that is, whether criminals are
born as such, or are limited as a product of their role models, education and other experiences.
890	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 35:885
reformers won the debate, and eventually established much of the
modern welfare state and criminal justice system.42 In the realm of
juvenile justice, a second generation of Child Savers, incensed by the
fact that children were punished like adults and incarcerated with
hardened adult offenders, fought against the unduly harsh treatment
of youths in the criminal court system 4 3 These reformers believed that
society could not fulfill its duty to the child through the simple and
callous meting out of punishments." Accordingly, the reformers advo-
cated the reevaluation of juvenile justice based on the "rehabilitative
ideal," a concept centered on the use of individualized diagnoses of
youthful offenders, and on non-punitive treatment methods. 45
Illinois established the first juvenile court in 1899, adopting the
parens patriae philosophy which once imbued the Houses of Refuge
and the many programs of the Child Savers.46 The court, unlike its
predecessors in interest, theoretically gave juveniles special attention
by means of confidential hearings and individualized dispositions di-
rectly responsive to their "best interests." 47 In principle, judges did not
inquire as to the innocence or guilt of the child, but instead asked:
"What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done
in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career."48 Judges abided by the belief of rehabilitative phi-
losophy: that the child is essentially good, and should therefore be
made to feel that the state's role is as a benevolent guardian.°
In its concern for accommodating youths based on their particular
situations and needs, the juvenile court, from the apprehension of
youths to their institutionalization, differed both ideologically and
Murray Levine, et al., Juvenile and Family Mental Health Law in Sociohistorieal Context, 10 MI,
,I.L. & PSYCHIATRY 91, 100 (1987).
Krisberg, supra note 23, at 27. The reformers of the Progressive Era effected, among other
facets of contemporary criminal justice, the extensive use of indeterminate sentences and parole,
the public defender movement, and the scientific study of crime. Id.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14, 15 (1967).
44 Id. at 15.
45 1ra M. Schwartz, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE. BENT INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 150 (1989).
46 Krisberg, supra note 23, at 30. The juvenile court concept was accepted with amazing speed
such that by 1925, all but two states had some form of juvenile court. M
47 Schwartz, supra note 45, at 150.
49 Julian Mack, Thefuvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909), quoted in In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967); see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
49 7n m Gault, 387 U.S. at 15. A key assumption of this rehabilitative approach is that only
restorative treatment methods, and not purely punitive ones, can check criminal tendencies
before they harm society. Skibinski, supra note 8, at 48.
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structurally from the criminal justice system. i 0 A crucial aspect of this
separation was the informal processing of young offenders, without the
distracting rigors of a criminal tria1. 5 ' Youths enjoyed no right to coun-
sel, no privilege against self-incrimination, no right to a speedy and
public trial, and no right to confrontation of the accusers, among other
deprivations,52 and juvenile court hearings were held in private." Hence,
the juvenile court framers abandoned the procedural protections and
adversarial structure of adult proceedings as unnecessary and counter-
productive to the juvenile courts' specialized parens patriae underpin-
nings.54 The juvenile court thus discarded the abrasive nature of sub-
stantive and procedural criminal law along with notions of crime and
punishment." Despite the benevolent intentions of the juvenile court,
however, procedural abuses eventually led to a reevaluation of its in-
formal structure, of its efficacy in treating delinquency and of the
practicability of the rehabilitative ideal itself. 56
B. The Failure of the Rehabilitative Promise
In the early part of this century, criticism of the juvenile court
focused on its seemingly unlimited discretion. i 7 Indeed, as the case-
loads of courts in urban areas became too much to maintain within
the original operational theory of the juvenile courts, the conceptual
image of the courts as cautious and caring benefactors disintegrated,•
Individualized evaluations of young offenders became perfunctory as
the amount of time afforded each child before the court decreased,
5° In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
51 Schwartz, supra note 45, at 151. A rationalization for the lack of procedural rigor was that
the state was in essence assuming the role in which the child's parents' had ostensibly failed, and,
therefore, the juvenile proceedings were "civil" in nature. As a result, the proceedings were not
subject to the requirements normally placed upon a slate seeking to deny a person's liberty. Gault,
387 U.S. at 17. As the Gault Court observed: "The traditional ideas of juvenile court procedure,
indeed, contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to establish precisely
what the juvenile did and why he did it—was it a prank of adolescence or a brutal act threatening
serious consequences to himself or society unless corrected?" Id. at 28.
52 Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. Although the United States Supreme Court observed that the right
to counsel was available in some jurisdictions, the Court did not hold that the right to counsel
applied to juveniles under the Sixth Amendment until one year later in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
41 (1967).
"Schwartz, supra note 45, at 150.
54 See id. at 150-51.
55 Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
56 Krisberg, supra note 23, at 49. The Supreme Court noted in In re Gault that "Juvenile
Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated,
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." 387 U.S. at 18.
57 Krisberg, supra note 23, at 30.
55 Id. at 31.
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and the quality of probationary supervision was spread so thin as to be
rendered virtually meaningless." By the middle part of the twentieth
century, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the juvenile
courts were not performing adequately as parens patriae.6° Not only
were children being deprived of the procedural protections accorded
to adults, but the juvenile court was failing to provide the quid pro quo
of careful case-by-case analysis and regenerative treatment it originally
promised."
In 1966, in Kent v. United States, the United States Supreme Court,
recognizing the imbalance in the juvenile court's structure, held that
a juvenile court's decision to waive its jurisdiction, thus sending a youth
to district court for trial as an adult, was unconstitutional. 62 The juve-
nile defendant in Kent appealed a criminal court conviction for house-
breaking and robbery." The Court reasoned that the philosophical
pedigree of the juvenile court as pareiu patriae could not support
waiving the defendant to the adult court without appropriate justifica-
tion." Thus, the Court concluded that the defendant had been de-
prived of due process and of his right to counsel."
The defendant in Kent, a sixteen-year-old youth, was arrested for
housebreaking, robbery and rape." The defendant filed motions in
the juvenile court for a hearing on the question of waiver of jurisdic-
tion and for access to his probation records being held by the court.°
The juvenile court declined to rule on these motions and waived
jurisdiction without a written record of its reasoning. 68 The criminal
court convicted the defendant on the six counts of housebreaking and
robbery, and sentenced him to a total of thirty to ninety years in
89 Id
69 Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966).
61 /n re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 18 (1967).
62 383 U.S. at 546, 554, 557. "Waiver" refers to the discretionary power of a juvenile court
judge to transfer a youth, under circumstances defined by statutes governing the court, for trial
in a criminal court, thus subjecting the child to criminal penalties. Fox, supra note 14, at 249.
Justice Fortas wrote, "there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without ceremony—without a hearing, without effective assistance of
counsel, without a statement of reasons.... It would be extraordinary if society's special concern
for children ... permitted this procedure." Kent, 383 U.S. at 554.
63 383 U.S. at 550.
64 Id at 555, 556-57.
63 Id, at 557. Specifically, the Court stated that the district court's waiver order was invalid
under the Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia "read in the context of constitutional
principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel." Id.
66 Id at 543.
67 Id. at 545, 546.
68 Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
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prison.° The court of appeals affirmed. 7° The defendant appealed to
the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the juvenile
court's waiver was constitutionally defective. 7 I
The Supreme Court reasoned that the juvenile court's authority
to function in a parental capacity does not allow it to be arbitrary in
its procedure, because constitutional limitations of clue process and
the assistance of counsel are applicable to the juvenile court process. 72
In dicta, the Court recognized that although the rehabilitative premise
of the juvenile court is laudable, it has not adequately fulfilled its goals
as /arens patriae. 75 The Court asserted that, "[t]here is evidence .. .
that the child receives the worst of both worlds [in the juvenile courts]:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solici-
tous care and regenerative treatment postulated For children. " 79 The
Court declined, however, to rule on the general constitutionality of
depriving youths of certain due process protections in return for the
juvenile courts' focus on individualized treatment. 75 Instead, the Court
narrowed its opinion to holding that in order for a waiver of juvenile
court jurisdiction to be valid, the juvenile must be given a hearing, his
counsel must be given access to information held by the court regard-
ing his client, and the juvenile court judge must provide a written
explanation of his waiver decision. 76
Commentators suggest that the most significant acknowledgment
that the juvenile court had failed to live up to the "rehabilitative ideal"
was issued by the United States Supreme Court the following year," in
In re Gault. 78 In Gault, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment entitles youths in delinquency proceed-
ings to many of the constitutional rights guaranteed to adults."'" The
juvenile court found the fifteen-year-old defendant delinquent and
sent him to a reform school until his twenty-first birthday. 8" The Su-
69 Id. at 550. The defendant was acquitted on the rape charges by reason of insanity. Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 552. The defendant argued several grounds 	 reversal, including constitutional
violations, but. the Court expressly limited its holding to the issue of invalid waiver. Id. at 551,
552.
72
 Id. at 555, 557.
73 Kew, 383 U.S. at 555-56.
74 1d. at 556.
75
 Id. at 556, 557.
76 1d. at 557,
"See Skibinski, supra note 8, at 45,'18,
70 87 U.S. 1 (1967).
70 Id. at 33, 41, 55, 57.
g° Id, at 7.
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preme Court reasoned that the defendant's juvenile status could not
justify the summary process used by the juvenile court to arrive at this
disposition. 8' Instead, the Court concluded that juveniles are entitled
to notice of the charges against them, a right to counsel, a right to
confrontation and cross-examination, and a privilege against self-in-
crimi nation. 82
The Gault Court recognized that a delinquency finding is criminal
in nature, insofar as its consequences are comparable to those of
criminal proceedings." Additionally, it observed that although the
juvenile court is based upon a premise that rigorous procedural rights
are not required due to its benevolent, rehabilitative function, the
juvenile court had clearly not been able to provide the careful, indi-
vidualized treatment promised to its wards." Consequently, the Court
reasoned that the only difference actually realized between juvenile
and adult proceedings was that the procedural safeguards available to
adults were not provided for minors 85' Thus, the Court found that the
mere fact of the defendant's juvenile status could not justify depriving
him of his basic constitutional protections."
Using Gault as a foundation, the United States Supreme Court, in
the 1970s, continued to expand constitutional protections for youths
based on its perception of the juvenile justice system's unfulfilled
promises. 87 For example, in 1970, in In re Winship, the Court held that
in delinquency proceedings, the Constitution requires that the stand-
ard be one of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than merely a
81 See i a at 29.
82 Id at 33, 41, 55, 57. In dicta, the Court implied that juveniles might also have a basis for
claiming a right to a transcript of the proceedings, and a right to appellate review. Id. at 58.
83 387 U.S. at 36. The Kent Court said that juvenile proceedings are intended to be civil in
nature. 383 U.S. 541, 554.
84 Id. at 15, 17-18, 18 n.23. The Court quoted the Chairman of the Pennsylvania Council of
Juvenile Court Judges: "Unfortunately, loose procedures, high-handed methods and crowded
court calendars, either singly or in combination, all too often, have resulted in depriving some
juveniles of fundamental rights that have resulted in a denial of due process." Id at 19.
85 Id. at 28-29. The Court found it illustrative that had the defendant been convicted in an
adult court firr his offense, the maximum penalty would have amounted to only a $50 fine or two
months in jail. Id. at 29. Although the Court did not rule as to whether the due process rights
owed to children are the same as those accorded to adults, it reasoned that providing basic
protections would not detract from any substantive benefits sought to be conferred upon youths
by the juvenile courts. Id. at 21, 27.
88 Id. at 28, 33, 41, 55, 57.
87 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) (asserting that "good intentions" of
juvenile justice do not obviate need for Due Process protections); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
528 (1975) (recognizing that "there is a gap between the originally benign conception of the
system and its realities").
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preponderance of the evidence. 88 In Winship, the trial court used a
preponderance of the evidence standard to convict the defendant, a
twelve-year-old boy, of stealing money from a woman's pocketbook that
he found in a locker, 89 The Court reasoned that a delinquency adjudi-
cation may deprive a child of his or her liberty for many years, just as
in the case of a felony prosecution of an adult." Moreover, the Court
recognized that the purportedly non-punitive, rehabilitative goals of
the juvenile justice system could not guarantee youths protection con-
sonant with this threat.'' The Court concluded, therefore, that notwith-
standing the "good intentions" of the juvenile justice system, a child
cannot be found delinquent absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
The United States Supreme Court again expanded juvenile rights
in 1975, in Breed u Jones. The Breed Court held that the double jeopardy
principle applies to juveniles as well as to adults." A juvenile court
found the defendant in Breed delinquent for committing armed rob-
bery." Subsequently, the juvenile court transferred the defendant to a
criminal court which convicted him of the same crime, though as an
adult." Following the logic of Gault and Winship, the Breed Court
reasoned that the shortcomings of the juvenile justice system demanded
a response providing juveniles with the constitutional protections pre-
viously granted only to defendants in the criminal courts." Hence, the
Court held that a criminal court prosecution of a juvenile subsequent
to a juvenile court trial on the same charge violates the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause of the Constitution."
Scholars assert that Gault and its progeny effected more than the
granting of procedural protections to youths in the juvenile court."
88 397 U.S. at 368.
"Id. at 360.
99 Id. at 366.
91 Id. at 365-66,
92 Id. at 365-66, 368.
13 Brced v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975). The Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal
defendants from multiple trials and convictions on the same charge. Id. at 532.
" Id. at 521, 522.
95 Id. at 525.
98 Id. at 528-29.
97 Id. at 541.
98 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, CriminalizingJuvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for theJuvenile Court,
69 MINN. L. Rev. 141, 161 (1984) (asserting that these cases effected a movement in the juvenile
courts toward the ideology of the criminal courts); Gardner, supra note 7, at 134 ("Gault, Winship,
and Breed significantly call into question the rehabilitative pedigree of juvenile justice."); ELLEN
RYERSON, Tile BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 150 (1978) (observing
United States Supreme Court's recognition of juvenile courts' failure to live up to rehabilitative
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Specifically, these cases articulate that the juvenile justice system, al-
though founded on rehabilitative ideals, is actually punitive in prac-
tice." Moreover, some commentators suggest that there may be an
emerging willingness by the United States Supreme Court, as illus-
trated in 1984 in Schall v. Martin, to accept the arguably punitive
treatment of youths in the juvenile justice system.m
In Schall, the Court held that the pretrial detention of youths
accused of committing crimes is not punitive in nature, and represents
a legitimate means of protecting youths and protecting society from
those youths.'°' Schall involved a class action suit brought by three
youths incarcerated prior to trial under the provisions of the New York
Family Court Act. 1 °2 The Court reasoned that the importance of crime
prevention outweighed the statute's potentially punitive effects, espe-
cially in light of the high rate of recidivism among jtweniles.m Hence,
the Court held that the pretrial detention provisions were constitu-
The Schall opinion considers the cases of three fourteen-year-old
youths: Gregory Martin, Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan.m Martin
was held fifteen days under the pretrial detention statute.tw Rosario,
with three prior delinquency petitions on his record, was apparently
held in pretrial detention for twenty days.'° 7 Morgan, who had been
99
 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. at 528; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 27, 49-50 (1967); Feld, supra note 98, at 161.
1(4° Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and the Minimization of Children's Constitutional Rights:
Implications for the juvenile Justice System, 13 HAMLINE J. Pun. L. & Pot.'v 199, 200, 209 (1992);
see also Krisberg, supra note 23, at 50 (asserting that Scholl v. Martin heralded more conservative
approach by Supreme Court regarding children's rights).
lw Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. at 268, 271. justice Rehnquist stated for the Court, "We cannot
conclude from this record that...pretrial detention 'is imposed for the purpose of punishment'
rather than as 'an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.'" Id. at 271 (quoting
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)).
102 Id. at 258, 259, 260-61. The class consisted of thirty-four juveniles being held in detention
awaiting trial at the time of filing. Id, at 261.
103 Id. at 264-65.
104 1d. at 281.
1 °5 Id. at 258, 259.
me' Schall, 467 U.S. at 259. Martin was arrested for robbery, assault and criminal possession
of a weapon, after a latemight incident during which he and two friends hit a youth on the head
with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and sneakers. Id. at 257.
107 Id. at 259-60. Rosario was detained under the statute pending trial for the robbery and
assault of two men: Rosario and four others allegedly put a gun to the head of one man, and
beat both men about the head with sticks. Id. at 259. The maximum period of detention under
the New York statute is seventeen days. Id. at 270. Justice Rehriquist's opinion states the total
number of days over which Martin and Morgan were held: fifteen and eight days, respectively;
but in the case of Rosario, the opinion merely recites that probable cause for pretrial detention
was found on March 20, and that on April 11, Rosario was released to his father. Id. at 259-60.
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arrested on four previous occasions, was detained for eight days."
Martin filed a habeas corpus class action on behalf of the three youths,
seeking a declaratory judgment that pretrial detention of minors un-
der the New York statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 1 °9 The District Court for the Southern District of
New York agreed with the petitioners, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.n"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.'" The Court
reasoned that the prevention of crime is a weighty social objective
which "persists undiluted" in the juvenile context, particularly in light
of the high rate of recidivism among juveniles."' The Court also noted
that every state allowed some form of pretrial detention of juveniles."
Additionally, the Court reasoned that there was no express intent to
punish on the part of the State, and that the provisions of the statute
permitting a maximum pretrial detention of seventeen days were not
excessive in relation to its public safety objective. 114 Thus, the Court
held that the New York statute providing for pretrial detention of
juveniles was a legitimate exercise of state power through the juvenile
court) 15
In summary, that the juvenile court was originally founded upon
non-punitive, rehabilitative notions is well recognized."'" But in the
view of the United States Supreme Court this pedigree may amount to
only so much history.' " 7 Indeed, the Court clearly opines in Kent, Gault,
Winship and Breed that the "rehabilitative ideal" has not been real-
Hence, it seems that Rosario was held for twenty days, a period longer than the statutory
allowance. See id.
I " Id. at 260. Morgan was arrested for robbery and grand larceny for trying to rob a
fourteen-year-old girl and her brother by thrcalening to blow their heads off. Id.
1 "9 Id. at 260-61.
°° Id. at 261, 262. The District Court felt that the trial record was "replete" with examples of
arbitrary and capricious detentions committed pursuant to the statute, and concluded that
preventative detention in this situation amounted to punishment without a finding of guilt.. Id.
at 262 n.12. Likewise, the Court of Appeals Concluded that the true purpose of the pretrial
detention allowed by the statute was punitive, and not regulatory in nature. Id. at 271.
1 11 Schall, 467 U.S. at 281.
112 14. at 264, 265.
m Id. at 266-67.
114 Id. at 264, 269.
" 5 1d. at 281.
" 6 See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 529 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365
(1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966);
Gardner, supra note 7, at 130; Skibinski, supra note 8, at 44-45; Fox, supra note 14, at 1-2.
117 Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56; Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-18; Winship, 397 U.S. at 365; Breed, 421
U.S. at 528.
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ized. 118
 As these decisions illustrate, the Court's response has been to
arm juveniles with Constitutional protections previously unavailable to
them, as a means of combating the potential punitive effects of the
juvenile justice system."° Scholars suggest, however, that Schall may
mark an attitude shift.'"Writing for the Court in Schall, Justice Rehnquist
asserted that the goal of protecting society justifies the conservative
reaction embodied by pretrial detention of juveniles, even though
detention may later be found to be unwarranted.'" Thus, scholars have
interpreted Schall as signaling a less progressive approach to handling
juveniles than the stance previously assumed by the Court in Gault,
Winship, and Breed.' 22 Additionally, the Court's reaction seems to mir-
ror the pervasive attitude of the public, which is, understandably,
experiencing an increasing sense of vulnerability and fear.'"
III. THE JUVENILE GUN CULTURE AND DEMANDS FOR ACTION
From the folds of the morning paper, reasons for fear come in
colors. 124 Moreover, according to recent statistics, the picture painted
by the media is fairly accurate. 12' Specifically, the 1980s yielded a sev-
enty-nine percent increase in the number of juveniles who committed
murders with guns. 126
 Between 1987 and 1991 alone, the number ar-
rested for murders involving guns rose eighty-five percent.' 27 Similarly,
the number of juveniles convicted for all violent crimes increased by
fifty percent during the same period.'"
118
 Breed, 421 U.S. at 528; Winship, 397 U.S. at 365; Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-18; Kent, 383 U.S.
at 555-56.
119 Breed, 421 U.S. at 541; Winship, 397 U.S. at 368; Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 57.
120 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
121 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 273 (1984) (adopting this proposition from language
used by New York Court of Appeals).
122
	 supra note 100 and accompanying text.
125 See, e.g., Skibinski, supra note 8, at 43-44, 45-46.
129 See, e.g., Freemantle, supra note 8, at Al; Henderson, supra note 7, at B3; Ratcliffe, supra
note 7, at 1; May, supra note 8, at IA.
125
	 e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S742 (daily ed, Jan. 25, 1994) (incorporating into Congressional
Record a four-part series written by Des Moines Register on juvenile crime).
I 26 Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun & Laura Lee, juvenile Justice: Should 13- Year- Olds 4111w Commit
Crimes With Firearms Be Tried As Adults?, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 46. (from Sen. Moseley-Braun's
article debating how to address juvenile violence).
127 139 CONG. REC. 515,019 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Byrd from West
Virginia) (this compares to an increase of only twenty-one percent among individuals over
eighteen years of age). Additionally, the FBI reports thatjuvenile arrests for murder, robbery and
assault increased by fifty percent from 1988 to 1992. Toch, supra note 1, at 34.




In schools, where America's children spend the greater part of their
days, an estimated 270,000 guns accompany youths to class daily.' 29 In
Ilia, a recent survey conducted by the University of Michigan indicates
that nine percent of eighth graders reportedly choose a gun, knife or
club to bring to school at least once a month.'" As one commentator
noted, although children once settled disputes with their fists, youths
today are settling them with bullets.' 3 ' Indeed, at least forty-five school
systems—including elementary schools—now use metal detectors to
screen incoming students.'" Moreover, inner city schools have ap-
pended "drive-by-shooting drills" to their traditional fire drills in order
to cope more effectively with the recent rise in urban juvenile war-
fare.'" All told, more than three million crimes a year are committed
in or near America's 85,000 public schools.' i 4
When the afternoon bell rings, the violence only escalates. Ameri-
cans during the period from 1960 to 1981 witnessed a nearly 250% in-
crease in juvenile arrests for violent crime.' 35 Youth firearm murders re-
portedly increased by ninety-seven percent from 1984 to 1987 alone.'"
The FBI reports that juvenile arrests for murder, robbery and assault
increased by fifty percent from 1988 to 1992.' 37 Today, although juve-
niles represent less than fourteen percent of the population in this
country, they account for nearly twenty-five percent of individuals
arrested for major violent crimes such as homicide, rape, robbery and
felonious assault.'"
In 1991, 122,000 juveniles were arrested for violent crimes, the largest number in U.S history.
Id. For purposes of these statistics, "violent crimes" include murder, forcible rape, armed robbery
and aggravated assault. Id.
Ii9 Toch, supra note 1, at 31. During the 1991-1992 school year, 1,403 weapons were confis-
cated in the Los Angeles unified School District, a twenty-seven percent increase over the previous
year. Daniel B. Wood, Growing Violence lry Youths Leads to a National Debate Over School -Safety
Measures, CHRISTIAN. SG!. MoNrroR., Jan. 29, 1993, at I, 4. Of those weapons, 373 were guns,
thirty-three of which were confiscated in elementary schools. Id.
us'quch, supra note I , at 35 (citing University of Michigan survey).
"11 140 CONG. REC. 5742 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1994) (quoting Hon. George Stigler, a judge in
Iowa).
IToch, supra note 1, at 34-35.
1 " Id. at 32,
134 Id. at 31. It has been estimated that 282,000 students and 5,200 teachers are physically
attacked each month. Gardner, supra note 7, at 140.
155 Gardner, supra note 7, at 140. This increase in juvenile arrests was more than twice that
for adults during the same period. Id.
136 See Youth Homicide and School Violence at Record Levels, New Center Research Shows, HAND-
GUN CONTROL SEMI-ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT (Handgun Control, Inc., Washington, D.C.), Jan.
1991, at 6.
137 Toch, supra note 1, at 34.
'"Gardner, .supra note 7, at 140.
900	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 35:885
In urban and rural areas across the country, society is perceiving
the increasingly violent nature of juvenile crime.' 39
 Everywhere, people
are trying to come to grips with the emergence of a youth culture with
little regard for human life.'" Indeed, the increasing use of firearms
in acts of juvenile violence has caused a pronounced upsurge in fear."'
Small business owners fear that they may be robbed at any moment."'
Parents fear that their children may be shot at school.'" Entire com-
munities live in the shadow of unremitting, random acts of youth
violence.'"
Moreover, the high rates of recidivism experienced by juvenile
correction programs can only serve to exacerbate the public's anxi-
' 9 See, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. 514,938 (daily ed. No 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lott); Ira M.
Schwartz, et al., Public Attitudes Toward Juvenile Crime and juvenile Justice: Implications for Public
Policy, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 241, 249 (1991). In a nationally conducted scientific poll, eighty-two
percent of those surveyed believed that juvenile crime had increased in their respective states
during the last three years. Id. Of those surveyed, sixty-two percent felt that the increase was
substantial. Id; see also John King, Violence: Many Lawmakers Rethink Views on Firearm Restrictions,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at A10; Jodi Mailander, Parents TOughen Juvenile Penalties, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 7, 1993, (Local), at 213; May, supra note 8, at IA; Oppel, supra note 9, at 1J.
14[) 140 CotaG. REC. 5742 (daily ed. jan. 25, 1994) (commenting on cold-blooded and remorse.
less character of violent juvenile crime); JosEm. F. SHELEY & JAMES D. WRIGHT, GUN ACQUISITION
AND POSSESSION IN SELECTED SAMPLES, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVEN-
TION, DEPT. (it• JUSTICE 10 (1993) (researchers were struck less by the juveniles' ability to obtain
firearms than by their apparent willingness to pull the trigger). The Department of Justice study
is based on a 1991 survey of 758 young men in schools and 835 in correctional facilities in
California, New jersey, Louisiana and Illinois. SHELEY & WRIGHT, supra, at 1. The authors warn
that the results obtained are technically not generalizable because the study focused on serious
juvenile offenders and students from schools in high-risk areas. Id. at 3; see also Curtis Krueger,
Judge in Rage OverJuverrile Justice, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, (Tampa Bay and State),
at 413 (defendant youth in juvenile court threatened to shoot judge); Mailander, supra note 139,
at 2B (citing murder of British tourist in North Florida by group of juveniles, and slaying of
homeless man in Miami by thirteen-year-old boy).
141 See, e.g., SI I EI.FW & WRIGHT, supra note 140, at 2; Barstow, supra note 6, at 1B; Fremantle,
supra note 8, at Al (Dr. James Wright, one of the nation's authorities on guns and criminals,
asserts that climate for gun control is more favorable now than ever before in American history:
"People have had it."); Krauss, supra note 8, at Al (99 to 1 vote to enact juvenile handgun
possession ban in Senate was affirmation of growing fears of juvenile violence); May, .supra note
8, at IA; Roy Romer, If You're Under 18, Hand Over That Gun, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 2, 1993,
(EDP), at 11A (Governor of Colorado explains reasons for new juvenile gun possession ban).
According to Tint Moore, head of Florida's Department of Law Enforcement, people are "fright-
ened and we need to take some drastic measures quickly." May, supra note 8, at IA.
142 Barstow, supra note 6, at IB (owner of the Handy Corner Food Store in Baskins, Florida,
carries a gun in his waistband).
143 See Mail:m(1er, supra note 139, at 213; see also Thch, supra note 1, at 32.
144 See supra note 140 and accompanying text; see also, Jerry Buckley, The Tragedy in Room
108: An Angry Teen Killed His Teacher and Forever Changed a Kermit-fry Town, U.S. NEWS & Woxt.n
Rep., Nov. 8, 1993, at 41.
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ety. 145 A recent federal study of juvenile courts concluded that less than
one-third of the juveniles accused of violent acts actually remain in
custody; and even those who are enrolled in the best rehabilitation
programs available are likely to resume their criminal paths.''''' One
estimate places the typical juvenile recidivism rate at seventy percent
or higher.' 47 A direct consequence of this may be, as one scholar
suggests, a heightened disillusionment with the juvenile justice system
in general." 8
As society's fear of juvenile violence grows, its willingness to em-
brace a punitive juvenile justice agenda grows with km Indeed, studies
have demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of society would
support tough criminal penalties for juveniles as a means of making
the streets safe again.''" Thus, the historically rehabilitative underpin-
nings of the juvenile justice system seem ready to give way to a new
philosophy incorporating punishment as the central mode of' deter-
rence.' 5 '
As many political figures have noted, one thing is certain: the
public's fear of the rise in juvenile violence must be adclressed.' 52 The
principle issue, however, is how this will be done.'" Commentators have
recognized that society's increasing willingness to adopt a punitive
stance has already played an important role in the shaping of things
145 See Sella]] v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); Gardner, supra note 7, at 136; Toch, supra
note 1, at 37.
146 See Tocli, supra note 1, at. 37. Those who do not remain in custody are put on probation
or set free. Id. An estimated three percent are waived to adult court for trial. Id.
147 See Tod], supra note I, at 37.
148 Gardner, supra note 7, at 136. Martin Gardner suggests that the failure of rehabilitative
theory created a conceptual void, clearing the way for punitive theory to take its place. M.
146 See 140 CON(;. km. S742 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1994) (asserting that the American people
now support mandatory minimum sentences); Schwartz, supra note 139, at 251. The authors'
study has shown that the fear of' being the victim of violent crime is closely related to punitive
attitudes toward juvenile offenders. Id.
ISOSchwartz, supra note 139, at 258 (discussing authors' study as well as previous studies that
establish link between public fear and willingness to accept punitive measures for deterring
juvenile crime).
151 Gardner, supra note 7, at 131-32. "IA] revolution in substantive theory is presently taking
place as one jurisdiction alter another expresses disenchantment with the rehabilitative ideal and
embraces explicitly punitive sanctions as appropriate for youthful offenders." Id.
152 See, e.g., 139 Com:. Rae. 514,938 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lott from
Mississippi). As Senator Herbert H. Kohl put it: "Violent crime in America is not just escalating,
it has exploded. From our inner cities to our rural communities it is all the same. A world of
threats and brutality and death. Our citizens are tired of living in fear and they want Congress
to do something about it." Karen J. Cohen, Feingold One of Four Rejecting Crime Bill, STATE.s Naws
SERvicE, Nov. 19, 1993,
153 139 CONG. RE C. S14,038 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lott from Mississippi);
Moseley-Braun, supra note 126, at 46-47 (debate over how to address juvenile crime problem).
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to come.' 54
 Indeed, this notion has been manifesting itself in recent
actions by various state legislatures, particularly in the area central to
the most disturbing statistics—gun control.' 55
IV. ADDRESSING SOCIETY'S FEARS: A PUBLIC SAFETY RESPONSE To
JUVENILE VIOLENCE
Central to the growing fear of juvenile violence is the gun control
problem.'" In particular, there is an ample supply of firearms available
through legal and illegal means from which to satisfy an increasing
demand by juveniles for guns.'" Consequently, as the modern romance
between youths and guns escalates, a widespread concern for public
safety now dominates the gun control debate.'" The state legislatures
have reflected this theme through the enactment of laws which address
both the supply and demand sides of the gun control equation. 159
 Thus,
these laws may be grouped into two categories: (1) provisions which
prohibit gun sales to youths, or which discourage legal owners of guns
from allowing youths access to them; and (2) provisions which prohibit
juveniles from possessing guns under penalty of law.' 6°
A. Targeting Supply: An Overview of State Legislative Reactions
The first group of laws attempts to curb the supply of guns to
juveniles. 15 ' State legislatures have typically employed two principle
154 See, e.g., Freemantle, supra note 8, at Al (shift in public attitudes made firearm ban
possible in Arizona); Romer, supra note 141, at 11A (frightened Colorado citizens provided
impetus for new juvenile gun possession ban).
155
 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
tai Ropier, ,supra note 14!, at 11A.
157 SIIELEY & WRIGHT, supra note 140, at 10.
155 Freemande, supra note 8, at Al (noting that National Rifle Association's Bill of Rights
stance has been rejected by Arizona Legislature). Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, expressed
the reasons for Colorado's new youth handgun possession ban in public safety terms: "For the
sake of our children and our neighborhoods, we had to at least try to get handguns out of the
hands of teenagers." Romer, supra note 141, at 11A.
159 See, e.g., Cow. Ray. STAT. § 18-12-108.5(1)(a) (WESTLAW, CO-ST-ANN Database) (pos-
session of handgun by minor is illegal); § 18-12-108.7 (selling a handgun or recklessly allowing
juvenile to possess a handgun is class four felony punishable by two to eight years imprisonment
plus a $2000 to $5000 fine under § 18-1-105); 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 790.17(2)(A) (LEXIS,
Codes Library, Flcode File) (transfer or sale of firearm to youth tinder eighteen is felony);
790.22(5) (2)(A) (possession of firearm by minor is illegal).
160
 See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. § 18-12-108.7; 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 790.17. For the purposes
of this Note, discussion will be limited to the recent measures taken to prohibit youths from
possessing guns once the supply has provided them with the opportunity for possession, See infra
Table for complete citations and brief synopses of statutes prohibiting minors from possessing
handguns or other firearms.




methods of accomplishing this goal.'" The first involves measures
prohibiting the sale of guns to juveniles, and the second provides harsh
criminal penalties for those who intentionally or negligently allow
juveniles access to firearms.'" Both seek to end the acquisition by
juveniles of guns easily accessible in the home, or in the home of a
friend; or through the help of an older, more experienced acquain-
tance who can purchase a firearm for them through legal channels or
on the street.' 64 The findings of a recent study by the Department of
Justice, however, indicate that such measures are unlikely to erect
serious obstacles to violent youths seeking firearms.'
In particular, the Department of Justice reports that forty-one
percent of the male students interviewed in inner-city schools asserted
that they would have no trouble getting a gun. 166 Likewise, of the
incarcerated male juvenile offenders surveyed, seventy percent be-
lieved they would have no trouble obtaining another gun once they
were freed.' 61 Although many of the guns obtained by these urban
youths are purchased through legitimate channels, many derive from
untraceable sales or trades on the street, or from the robbing of legal
gun owners or through other illegal channels.' Indeed, the Justice
Department has recognized that the approximately seventy-two million
handguns legitimately possessed by private owners in this country
to possess a handgun is class four felony); 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 790.17 (transfer or sale of
firearm to youth under eighteen is felony).
162 Sea supra note 159 and accompanying text,
163 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
I" See, e.g., 1993 Fla, Sess. Law Serv. 790.17, 790.18, 790.22. Recently enacting measures
allowing fines or imprisonment of parents and other adults who allow guns into the hands of
youths, the Florida legislature stated, "it is the will of the Legislature and all Floridians that
parental . . . accountability, and responsibility become the key to solving our existing broken
juvenile criminal justice system." Id. (Preamble to Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 91-C).
Indeed, a recent study by the Department of Justice found that there were guns in the homes
of sixty-nine percent of the students surveyed. SHELEY & WRIGHT, supra note 140, at 4. Addition-
ally, forty-two percent of those surveyed attested to having friends who regularly carried guns. Id.
at 4.
165 SIILLEY & WRIGHT, supra note 140, at 6, 10 (assessing the modern youth gun culture);
see also 14.R. REP. No. 389, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993), In its recommendation to the House
of Representatives to pass a law prohibiting possession of handguns by minors, the Committee
on the Judiciary found that: "Firearms and ammunition, and handguns in particular, move easily
in interstate commerce, as documented in numerous hearings.. . ." Id.
165 SHE1.EY & WRIGHT, supra note 140, at 5-6. Another twenty-four percent said they would
only experience a little trouble. Id. at 6.
167 1d. at 5.
168 Id. at 6. A 1986 study estimates that only one out of six male handgun owners obtained
their most recent handgun through legal means. JAMES D. WItic,Hr & PETER H. Rossi, Maim
AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 185 (1986). Sheley &
Wright conclude that controls imposed at the point of retail sales would be largely ineffective by
themselves, because violent juveniles rarely obtain their guns through such customary channels.
SHELLY & WRIGHT, supra note 140 at 10.
904	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 35:885
represent a huge pool from which juvenile demand may be satisfied.' 69
Likewise, the black market in firearms assures that an urban youth with
the desire for virtually any variety of firearm need only get in touch
with the right person and pay the right price.'" Thus, it appears that
firearms will continue to be readily available to youths, despite the state
enactments directed at prohibiting that access.' 7 '
Scholars suggest that the only definitive solution to juvenile gun
possession and use lies in convincing youths that they do not want
guns. 112
 Conceivably, this could be effected through some form of
social counseling and education, or through the coercive power of the
law, by establishing penalties for gun possession designed to quell the
juvenile demand for guns.'" Many states, however, have chosen to
address the problem by attacking the demand by juveniles for guns.' 74
This approach is illustrated by the second group of laws, those com-
prised of statutes prohibiting minors from possessing guns and provid-
ing tough penalties for violations.'"
169 id. at 10.
170 David C. Anderson, Street Guns: A Consumer Guide, N.Y. Tim , Feb. 14, 1993, (Magazine),
at 20. The author illustrates the astounding array of weapons available on the illegal market,
ranging from "street sweepers" (rapid-firing shotguns), to "Saturday night specials." Id at 20-23.
According to the author, the guns are accessible to nearly everyone due to their low price. Id. at.
22.
171 SHELEY & WutcrIT, supra note 140 at 6, 10.
172 Id. at 10. After concluding that most of the at-risk youths surveyed believe that they need
guns for protection, Sheley and Wright suggest that "[tihe problem is less one of getting guns
out of the hands of juveniles and more one of reducing motivations (for the sample, primary
self-preservation) for youth to arm themselves in the first place." Id. at 7, 10.
171/ See id. at 10; supra note 160 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT, ANN. § 13-3111 (Stipp. 1993); COW. REV. STAT. § 18-12-
108.5(1) (a) (WESTLAW, CO-ST-ANN Database); 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 790.22 (LEXIS, Codes
Library, Flcode File). The preamble to the legislative bill enacted into law recently in Florida,
banning the possession of firearms by minors, states the reasons for Florida's action:
Whereas, the love affair between juveniles and firearms has reached an all time
high here in Florida, and Whereas, the courts, the Legislature, and law enforcement
cannot be the sole solution to stem our rising juvenile crime statistics, and Whereas,
it is the will of the Legislature and all Floridians that parental involvement, account-
ability, and responsibility become the key to solving our existing broken juvenile
justice system, and Whereas, it is the will of Floridians all across this great state of
ours that juveniles who violate laws pertaining to the illegal use of firearms be dealt
with in a swift and certain and severe manner. . . ."
Fla. H.R. 91-C (Preamble to Committee Substitute fbr House Bill no. 91-C) (enacted) (LEXIS,
Legis Library, Sttext File) (emphasis added).
175 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV, STAT. ANN. § 13-3111 (Stipp. 1993); Coto. REV. STAT. § 18-12-
108.5(1) (a) (WESTLAW, CO-ST-ANN Database); 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 790.22 (LEXIS, Codes
Library, Flcode File).
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B. Targeting Demand: State Prohibitions of Gun Possession by juveniles
1. The Movement Toward State Firearm Possession Bans
To date, twenty states have enacted statutes prohibiting minors as
a class from possessing handguns and other firearms and dangerous
weapons,'" six of them within the past year alone.'" Political figures
cite the fearsome character and unremitting persistence of violent
juvenile crime as the driving force behind these enactments.'" It is
therefore not surprising that, as noted by the state legislatures in the
acts themselves, these laws are being enacted specifically as public
safety measures, 17° often in response to recent, well-publicized crimes
by juveniles.'" Florida, for example, took legislative action after four
teenagers allegedly shot a British tourist at a North Florida highway
rest stop.' 81 Likewise, the Colorado legislature acted in the aftermath
of the wounding of a six-year-old Denver youth from a drive-by shoot-
ing, and following a year in which a fourteen-year-old was shot by
another youth for his Colorado Rockies jacket, and a sixteen-year-old
was killed for his Denver Broncos jacket.' 82 Commentators suggest that
118 See ALASKA S'l'AT. § 11.61.220 (Stipp, Oct. 1993); Autz. REV, STAT. ANN. § 13-3111 (Stipp.
1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-119 (Michie 1993); CAI.. PENAL Com: § 12101 (West 1992); Cow,
Rev. STAT. § 18-12-108.5(1)(a) (WESTLAW, CO-ST-ANN Database) (see §§19-2-703, 708 for
source of penalties beyond mandatory live day detention); 1993 Ha. Sess. Law Serv, 790.22
(LEXIS, Codes Library, Flcode File); MINN. STAT. ANN, § 9711.021 (West 1987); NEIL REV. STAT.
§28-1204 (1989); Nr:v. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.300 (Miehie 1986); NJ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-6.1
(West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265,05 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.7 (1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-01 (Sapp. 1993); OR. Rev. STAT. § 166.250 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-
33 (1981); UTAtt CODE ANN. § 76-10-509 (Stipp. Jan. 1994); VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4008 (1974);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.7 (Michie Supp, 1993); W. VA. Cony § 61-7-8 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.60 (West Stipp. 1993). See infra Table for a summary of each of the firearm possession
bans and their associated penalties.
177 Ak17. REV. SEAT. ANN. § 13-3111; Cour. REV. STAT. § 18-12-108.5(1)(a); 1993 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. 790.22; N.C. GEN. SEAT. § 14-269.7 (1993); UTAII CODE ANN. A 76-10-509.4 (amending
dangerous weapons statute to include handguns and other firearms); VA. CODE ANN, § 18.2-308.7.
178 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 158 and accompanying text; see also Colo. H.B. 1001, 59th Gen. Assent., 1st
Extraordinary Sess., Section 16 (1993) (WESTERN CO-ST-ANN Database) (enacted). The Colo-
rado legislature confirmed that, "The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares
that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety."
Id, One scholar argues that with the failure of the parens palriae model of juvenile justice, the
police power underpinnings of the criminal justice system will find fertile ground in juvenile
justice terrain. Gardner, supra note 7, at 134.
IHO Barstow, supra note 6, at I B; Hugh Dellios, West Seeks to Tame Gun Violence Among Young,
CM. Dec., 19, 1993, at 23; May, supra note 8, at IA; Oppel, supra note 9, at U,
181 Barstow, supra note 6, at 1B.
182 Detlios, Supra note 181, at 23; May, supra note 8, at IA. In the case of Broderick Bell, the
six-year-old Denver youth, III he scenario was right out of a B movie: Girl gang member, veiled
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even in Arizona, where it is still legal to walk through the streets with
a loaded pistol strapped to the hip, the public's increasing fear of
juvenile violence led to the enactment of a juvenile gun possession
ban.'"
The second reason underlying the recent expansion in youth gun
possession bans, perhaps inextricably linked to the first, is the legisla-
tures' recognition that the juvenile justice system is not sufficiently
addressing violent juvenile crime.' 84 For example, the Florida legisla-
ture, in enacting a new youth gun possession ban, stated that what is
being addressed in this legislation is a "broken juvenile criminal justice
system." 185 Indeed, many are calling not just for improved methods of
dealing with violent youths, but for "swift and certain and severe"
punishment of those youths.'" Scholars suggest that this reaction is
neither new nor restricted to the realm of juveniles carrying guns.' 87
But society's increased willingness to supplant the rehabilitative as-
sumptions of traditional juvenile justice theory with punitive methods
of deterrence has provided a powerful force behind the move toward
enacting the new youth gun possession laws.'"
in a blue bandanna, hanging from a cruising car, squeezing off rounds as part of an initiation....
The 9min slug entered {Broderick's] forehead, lodging at the back of his skull." May, supra note
8, at 1A.
188 Freemantle, supra note 8, at Al (noting that an anti-possession statute would not have
been possible in Arizona only a few years ago). Additionally, in Utah, legislators took action in
the wake of two tragedies: first, the fatal shooting of a youth, attending a concert with his
girlfriend, at the hands of a gang member; and second, two weeks later, the serious injury of a
man by gunfire at the state's annual fair. Oppel, supra note 9, at 1 .1 (quoting Salt Lake City mayoral
aide Thom Dillon: "It was a shock to the city. These two highly publicized events really brought
things home. Everybody goes to the state fair, and people send their kids to concerts.").
184 See, e.g., supra note 174 and accompanying text (Preamble to Committee Substitute for
Florida House Bill No. 91-C).
Iss
186 See id. ; see also 140 CoNG. Rw. S742 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1994) (asserting that the American
people now support mandatory mi nirmun sentences); Mailander, supra note 139, at 2B (parents'
group in Florida calls for mandatory imprisonment of juveniles caught with guns); May, .supra
note 8, at IA (quoting Colorado state Senator Paul Weissman, lamenting insignificance of
Colorado's mandatory five-day detention period for juveniles convicted of possessing guns: "For
a lot of these kids, doing five days in jail is like gaining a merit badge.").
187 See Gardner, supra note 7, at 137. The author asserts that "[w]here earlier theorists were
embarrassed by the fact that punitive sanctions visited suffering upon the offender, the 'renais-
sance of retribution' in the 19705 and 80s marked an era in which many commentators, legisla-
tors, and judges, with wide-ranging political views, came to justify punishment largely because it
results in suffering." Id. (emphasis in original).
1l See, e.g., supra notes 175, 189 and accompanying text.
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2. The State of the Art in Juvenile Firearm Possession Prohibitions:
Arizona, Florida, and Colorado 189
As the attached Table illustrates, the statutes prohibiting youths
from possessing firearms, whether enacted last year or decades ago,
are woven with common threads.' 9" Although the lowest maximum age
provided by a state for application of its gun ban is fourteen, the
majority of the bans apply to juveniles under the age of eighteen. 19 '
Likewise, whereas a few of the statutes apply broadly to "dangerous
weapons" or narrowly to "handguns," most of the statutes prohibit the
possession of "firearms," a classification including handguns, but not
all dangerous weapons.' 92
 Additionally, all of the states provide excep-
tions or defenses to the bans.'" The penalties authorized by the youth
gun possession statutes, however, do not bear such uniformity, al-
though they may be classified into three categories: (1) those which
provide for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency upon violation; (2)
those which classify possession by a juvenile as a misdemeanor or
felony; and (3) those which provide specific punishments for the
offending youth.'" Although statutes providing penalties in the first
two categories may lead to dispositions associated with findings of
juvenile delinquency for an offense which would not be a crime if
committed by an adult,'• these statutes do not mandate specific puni-
tive measures.' 98
 In contrast, the third category, only recently appearing
through legislative actions of Arizona, Florida and Colorado, all of
which passed youth gun possession bans during 1993, represents the
189 Sec infra Table for a summary of the weapons prohibited by the statutes, the ages over
which the statutes apply, the exceptions to the bans, as well as a capsulation of the type of penalties
provided.
19° See, e.g., Cow, Riw. STAT. § 18-1'2-108.5(1)(a) (WESTLAW, CO-ST-ANN Database) (en-
acted in 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-8 (199'2) (enacted in 1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-47-33 (1981)
(enacted in 1950).
191 See infra Table.
192 See infra Table. Although the statutes differ in their definitions of prohibited types of
weapons, "handgun" generally includes pistols, revolvers, and other short-barreled hand-held
guns using shot; "firearm" generally includes handguns and other guns; and "dangerous weapon"
includes handguns, other firearms, as well as dangerous implements which may include throwing
stars, metallic knuckles and the like. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. 
.§ 948.60 (West Stipp. 1993)
(applying to dangerous weapons); COLO. REV. Siwi'. § 18-12-108.5(1) (a) (applying to handguns);
1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 790.22 (LEXIS, Codes Library, Flcode File) (applying to firearms).
193
 See infra Tam e.
1941d .
199 See Fox, supra note 14, at 37-40 (stating that whereas a child normally may be adjudicated
"delinquent" for committing an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult, a child
may also be found delinquent for committing an ollense under a law that applies only to
children).
196 See infra Table.
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modern trend of providing specific punitive penalties for youths pos-
sessing guns.' 97
Arizona's statute, for example, prohibits possession of firearms by
unemancipated minors under the age of eighteen.'" For possession of
an unloaded firearm, the statute specifically provides that, in addition
to penalties provided by other weapons statutes, the juvenile will be
fined a maximum of $250, and for possession of a loaded firearm, a
maximum of $500.' 99
 Additionally, for loaded or unloaded firearm
offenses, the court may order the revocation or suspension of the
youth's driver's license. 200 Both penalties apply equally to first offenders
and subsequent offenders alike, as well as to those youths already
endowed with lengthy juvenile court records. 2°'
The gun possession prohibition recently enacted in Florida makes
possession of a firearm by a youth under the age of eighteen illega1. 202
The specific consequences of possessing or using a firearm during the
commission of a crime under the new law depend on two factors: (1)
whether the offense is a first or subsequent violation; and (2) whether
the youth is charged under a Florida law involving possession or use,
other than under the new law itself 03
 The penalty for conviction of a
first offense of possessing a firearm includes 100 hours of mandatory,
supervised community service, and the revocation of the youth's driver's
license for up to one year. 204 For a subsequent offense, the statute
mandates 100 to 250 hours of community service, and driver's license
revocation for up to two years. 205
197
° 	 REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3111(A) (Stipp. 1993). See infra Table for a synopsis of
exceptions provided in the Arizona law. Although the legislature makes no particular finding
regarding the potentially heightened threat in Arizona's urban areas, the law provides that it is
only applicable in the inure urbanized counties of Pima and Mariacopa. § 13-3111(H). Spe-
cifically, the wording of the statute limits its application to counties of 500,000 or more persons,
and allows other counties to adopt an ordinance identical to the statute. Id.
" Id. at § 13-3111(D), (G).
2170 Id. at § 13-3111(D).
2111 See id. at§ 13-3111.
202 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 790.22 (LEXIS, Codes Library, Flcode File). See infra Table Ibr
a synopsis of exceptions provided in die Florida law.
203 1993 Fla. Sess, Law Serv. 790.22(5), (7)-(10). Regardless, the new law states that a minor
found guilty of possessing a firearm will be subjected to the specific penalties of the new law in
addition to any other penalties provided by other statutes. Id. at 790.22(5) (A).
2°4 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 790.22(5). The driving privilege will be revoked if it is currently
being exercised, and any current suspension will be extended, for up to one year. Id. Likewise,
if the offender is too young to drive, or otherwise temporarily ineligible to drive, the court will
order the state to withhold issuing a driver's license for a year beyond the lime when the offender
becomes eligible. Id.
2t6 Id. al 790.22(5) (13).
July 1999]	 JUVENILE GUNSLINGERS	 009
The new legislation provides that law enforcement authorities
must detain juveniles charged with possession of a firearm under a
separate statute until the preliminary hearing:21"' Moreover, if the court
finds a child to be a "clear and present danger to himself or the
community," it may extend the period of secure detention:2 ° 7 Further-
more, the new statute states that youths ultimately found to have
committed a crime involving a firearm (other than mere possession
under the new possession statute), who are not placed in a residential
commitment program, must be detained for a mandatory period of
five days and perform 100 hours of community service. 2°8 The statute
increases the mandatory detention period to ten days upon conviction
for a subsequent offense of this nature:21"' These mandatory punish-
ments provide the "certain and severe" punishment intended by the
Florida Legislature, as illustrated in the preamble to the new legisla-
tion, to aid Florida's failing juvenile justice system. 21 " They ensure that
if youths committing violent crimes with guns are not sent to rehabili-
tation facilities, they will at least be incarcerated for a predetermined,
definite period.2 "
Florida's juvenile gun possession ban was framed in the wake of
Colorado's recent enactment, which commentators tout as the high
watermark of youth gun possession statutes. 212 Similar to the Arizona
and Florida laws, the Colorado legislation provides that a juvenile
under eighteen who possesses a handgun or other firearm commits a
misdemeanor ,upon a first offense, and a felony upon a subsequent
offense.213 Unlike the Arizona and Florida laws, however, the Colorado
statute provides that prior to the preliminary hearing, there exists a
206 a at 790.22(8).
257 1d.
2" Id. at 790.22(0).
209 Id. at. 790.22(9)(B), The 100 hours of community service is still required and may he
increased to 250 hours. hi For a first or subsequent offense, and where no commitment to a
residential commitment facility is ordered, the youth's driving privileges will be revoked, Id, at
790.22(9), (10).
210 See supra note 174 and accompanying text (Preamble to Committee Substitute for Florida
House Bill No. 91-C).
2 " 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 790.22(9); see supra note 174 and accompanying text (Preamble
to CAmunittee Substitute for House Bill No. 91-C) (expressing desire of legislature to allow more
"certain" detention penalties fir violent youth crime).
212 Barstow, supra 'tote 6, at 1B; May, supra note 8, at IA. The constitutionality of the
presumption set up by the law has been questioned, and the issue is now awaiting review by the
Colorado Supreme Court. Dellios, supra note 181, at 23. However, it would seem that since the
presumption is rebuttable, and defendants would in any event have to persuade a judge that they
are not dangerous to society in order to avoid detention, this statute may not be far removed
from the one held constitutional in Schall v. Marlin. See 467 U.S. 253, 270, 281 (1984).
219 Cow. REV. Sm'r. § 18-12-1118.5(1) (a) (WESTLAW, CO-ST-ANN Database) (no distinction
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rebuttable presumption that juveniles taken into custody on the charge
of illegal possession of a handgun are a danger to themselves and to
the community, and a judge may order their incarceration pending
adjudication.'" In other words, this presumption shifts the burden on
defendant minors to disprove that they are a danger to the public,
prior to the determination of their guilt or innocence. 25 If they cannot
disprove the presumption, they may be immediately detained for up
to sixty days before trial, even if they are later found innocent. 216
Once tried and convicted of illegally possessing a firearm, juve-
niles face mandatory incarceration under the Colorado 1aw. 2 ' 7 That is,
first-offenders who are adjudicated as juvenile delinquents must be
sentenced to a minimum mandatory period of five days of incarcera-
tion:21s When combined with a potential period of sixty days in deten-
tion prior to trial, the mandatory sentence allows the state to incarcer-
ate a first offender for up to sixty-five days for being caught with a
gun.2 ' 9 Furthermore, the statute provides that the sentencing judge, at
his or her discretion, may extend the five-day mandatory sentence for
a first offense to as long as forty-five days. 22° Thus, the sentencing
structure potentially extends the pretrial and post-adjudication deten-
tion period to nearly three months. 22 '
In conjunction with enacting the possession statute, the Colorado
legislature also authorized the construction of a military-style training
camp, available at the discretion of the sentencing judge for those
youths sentenced to Colorado's Department of Institutions. 222 The stat-
ute provides that this alternative sentence is a substitute for the man-
datory five-day detention and potential forty-five days of detention. 223
Specifically, a youth convicted for a first offense of illegal handgun
possession may be placed in a sixty-day program of intensive physical
training and discipline. 224 Second or subsequent offenses, however,
between offenses involving loaded or unloaded firearms). See infra Table for a comparison to
the Arizona and Florida laws.
214 Id. at § 19-2-204.
215 See Id.
216 Id. at § 19-2-205 (requiring trial within sixty days of order to hold juvenile without bail).
217 Id. at § 19-2-703.
2 I 5 An amendment to § 19-2-703 enacted as part of the legislative package containing the
juvenile handgun possession ban eliminated a previously available option of ten days of public
service. Id. at § 19-2-703(1)(e) (Stipp. 1993), amended by, § 19.2-703 (1)(e) (WESTLAW, CO-ST-
ANN Database).
219 Id. a t § 19-2-204, 205, 703 (WESTLAW, CO-ST-ANN Database).
22° Id. at § 19-2-703(h) (Stipp. 1993).
221 Id.
222
 Id. at § 19-2-708.
225 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-708(3)(a) (WESTLAW, CO-ST-ANN Database).




mandate out-of-home commitment of one year or more. 225 Moreover,
the statute creates the possibility that a subsequent offense may lead
to as much as a two-year jail tertn. 22"
In summary, through recent enactments, state legislatures have
begun responding to their constituents' fears regarding juvenile vio-
lence. 227 Whereas some of these actions attempt to curb the supply of
guns to youths by providing criminal sanctions for adults who allow
children access to firearms, attention has recently focused on measures
intended to reduce the juvenile demand for guns. 225 This shift is typi-
fied by the juvenile gun bans passed in Arizona, Florida and Colo-
rado.229 The implications of these recent enactments on the juvenile
justice system's traditional rehabilitative philosophy, however, remain
unclear.
V. JUVENILE GUN POSSESSION PROHIBITIONS AS A MANIFESTATION OF
THE TREND TOWARD A PUNITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE:
A CALL FOR CIRCUMSPECTION
With society's fear of juvenile violence building to a crescendo,
lawmakers have struggled with ways to keep guns out of children's
hands.'" Although the traditional American conception of juvenile
justice argues that outright coercion is not an option, 23 ' there is a
military-styled boot-camp fbr 60 days of intensive discipline and physical training; (2) next, youths
participate in a community reintegration program involving job training and classroom education
components. Id. at § 19-2.708(3)(b),
275 1d. at § 19-2-801(1), (2) (Supp. 1993). Colorado's "Mandatory Sentence Offender" statute
provides that if a youth is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent twice, he or she will be committed
to an out-of-home facility for at least one year, unless the sentencing judge feels that a period of
less than one year is more appropriate. Id, Additionally, Colorado's "Repeat juvenile Offender"
statute provides that if a youth is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for a felony subsequent to a
finding of delinquency for any other offense, then he or she may be detained for a minimum
term to he specified at the discretion of the sentencing judge. Id. at § 19.2-802(1), (2) (Supp.
1993). Because "repeat offenders" by definition are also "mandatory sentence offenders" under
the Colorado definition, their sentences will presumably he at least as lough as those provided
by § 19-2-801(2). See id. at §§ 19.2-801, 802. A second offense of illegal possession of a handgun
by a minor is a class 5 felony in Colorado, thus submitting a second or subsequent offender to
the punishments provided for "repeat juvenile offenders". Id. at § 18-12-108.5(1)(c) (II) (WEST-
LAW, CO-ST-ANN Database).
226 See. Col.°. kEv. STAT. § 19-2-801(2)(a) (1993). A person who is eighteen years of age or
older at the time of sentencing for a second adjudication of juvenile delinquency for possessing
a handgun when they were a minor may be sentenced to a maximum of two years in county jail.
227 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
228
 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
229 See Supra note 198 and accompanying text.
231
 See supra !lows 159-75 and accompanying text.
231 SkibinSki, supra note 8, at 48 (traditional notions ofjuvenile justice dictate that redirection
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modern recognition that juvenile codes were constructed during a
period in our country's history when truancy, and not violent crime,
was the central problem and concern. 232 Faced with levels of youth
violence unknown to that era, many policy makers and commentators
argue that tougher, more punitive methods than those acceptable to
traditional concepts of juvenile justice are needed to address today's
problem. 233
The recent juvenile gun possession laws are manifestations of this
call for punishment. 234 Decidedly punitive in form and effect, they
represent a trend toward deterring violent youths through punish-
ment.2" These laws are not, however, evidence that traditional notions
of individualized treatment and rehabilitation will soon be excised
from the foundations of juvenile justice in America. 236 Undoubtedly,
juvenile justice, in the context of the youth gun possession bans, can
utilize notions of both rehabilitation and punishment so as to derive
the benefits available from each. 237 The answer lies in structuring the
law so that it circumspectly addresses both those youths who may only
need a reminder of what the law demands, and those who need more. 238
A. The Punitive Trend
The statutes passed by Arizona, Florida and Colorado in 1993 do
not accord well with traditional notions of juvenile justice."' By merely
depriving youths of liberties and privileges, they are not well focused
on understanding a youth's background and circumstances, or on the
is only attainable through understanding an individual youth's problems and providing them
•with benevolent guidance).
"2 Gregory Freeman, Alderman Tries to fight Arms, ST. LOUIS POS•-DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 1993,
(War Page), at OC.
2.33 See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. 515,019 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Byrd from
West Virginia advocating harsh and certain punishments for violent youths); 139 CONG. REC.
S14,939 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lott from Mississippi advocating swift and
certain punishment, and mandatory sentencing for violent crimes); Ratcliffe, supra note 7, at 1.
Mark Sanders, who works for Republican businessman and Texas politician Rob Mosbacher
asserts that the contemporary effect of outdated juvenile codes is to propagate "a system that tries
to deal with Dennis the Menace pulling flowers out of a garden when they're actually kids who
kill people." Ratcliffe, supra note 7, at I.
231 See infra notes 240-65 and accompanying text.
236 See infra notes 240-74 and accompanying text.
236 See infra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
237 See infra Section V.B.
23" See infra Section VI.
236 Professor Martin Gardner suggests that where early theorists found the infliction of
punishment upon juveniles an embarrassment, punishment is now resorted to for the mere fact
that it results in suffering. Gardner, supra note 7, at 137.
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concomitant goal of providing children with the individualized treat-
ment they need to become productive members of society. In this
manner, they address society's need for public safety at the expense of
the rehabilitative needs of individual children. In short, the new laws
represent a philosophy of deterrence through punishment.
This assertion becomes clear when the provisions of the statutes
are viewed with an eye focused on whose "needs" they serve."' That is,
whereas a genuine concern with treating children prone to misconduct
surely addresses juveniles' needs, a preoccupation with simply confin-
ing troubled youths more often and for longer periods focuses more
on the needs of the state. 241 The events precipitating the enactment of
the juvenile gun possession bans, the terms of the statutes, and the
statements of their drafters serve to illustrate that the statutes' foremost
purposes are to address the states' public safety concerns."' Florida
and Colorado, for example, enacted their prohibitions on the crest of
public anxieties following particularly violent crimes by juveniles with
guns.242 Likewise, Arizona's ban was a result of heightened fear. 2" 4 The
public cried out for punishment, and the legislators echoed those
cries.245 This demonstrates that the intent of the bans was to voice the
outrage of the public, and to show juveniles the seriousness with which
society views indiscretions involving guns.
Moreover, the sanctions mandated by the statutes offer little to-
ward rehabilitating youths, but a great deal toward deterring them
through official coercion."' Colorado's juvenile gun possession ban is
illustrative. 247 It provides incarceration as the central solution."' In fact,
under the Colorado law, an innocent youth can be held for as long as
sixty-five days before being found innocent."' Surely, this approach
effects very little toward rehabilitating even a guilty youth; for as one
scholar has observed, a juvenile can seldom be said to benefit from a
term of incarceration.25° Detention does, however, keep the juvenile off
the street or the public out of danger. Indeed, although the United
240 5ee Fox, supra note 14, at 47-48 (exploring whose needs, the state's or the child's, arc
involved in addressing delinquent youths).
241 See id.
2 ' 12 See supra notes 176-229 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text,
See supra mile 184 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 182-84.
24(i See supra notes 190-230.
2 '17 See supra notes 213-27.
218 See supra notes 215-22.
24 °See supra note 220 and accompanying, text,
250 See Fox, supra note 14, at 47-48.
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States Supreme Court, in Schall v. Martin, held that pretrial detention
is not presumptively punitive, the Court recognized the importance of
detention in preserving the public safety. 25 ' Thus, although there is
little connection between the Colorado provisions and serving the
rehabilitative needs of juveniles allegedly possessing guns, there is a
strong connection to serving the public's needs by protecting it from
juveniles' criminal conduct. 252
Similarly, the Arizona juvenile gun possession ban clearly seeks to
inhibit potentially violent youths by punishing them, as opposed to
treating them. 2" The gist of the statute is to deprive offending youths
of two adolescent pleasures—driving privileges and spending money:254
In light of these relatively light sanctions, the statute appears to be
directed only toward juvenile "fence-sitters," youths who might choose
to involve themselves in the growing gun culture if not somehow
deterred. 255 A remedy that rehabilitative theory suggests to aid these
potential delinquents, however, is individualized counseling.'" Under
this traditional philosophy, a juvenile court would need to inquire as
to how the youth arrived at this juncture, and how that child's needs
could best be addressed. 257 Instead, the Arizona statute adopts categori-
cal, unindividualized punishments to be applied to all juveniles, re-
gardless of their past influences or current stage of development.'"
Indeed, the statutory notes included in the statute indicate that the
legislature which enacted the ban was more concerned with the cer-
tainty of its punishments, than with the case-by-case needs of youths
who violate it.'"
Clearly addressing itself to public safety concerns at the expense
of children's needs, the Florida legislature expressly states its punitive
stance within the preamble to its youth gun possession prohibition. 26°
In the words of the bill, later enacted into law, the legislature intended
"that juveniles who violate laws pertaining to the illegal use of firearms
251 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984). The Court based its conclusion that pretrial detention is not
presumptively punitive in part on the assertion that the statute in that case evinced no intent to
punish. Id. The Federal District Court concluded, however, that the effect of pretrial detention
was no less punitive than that of post-trial incarceration. Id. at 262 n.12.
252 See supra note 180 and accompanying text
251 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3111 (Supp. 1993) (statutory text and Historical and
Statutory Notes).
251 See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
255 Barstow, supra note 6, at 1B (quoting Michael Ramage, General Counsel for the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement).
256 Schwartz, supra note 45, at 150.
257 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
211 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3111 (Supp. 1993).
259 Id. (Historical and Statutory Notes).
gal
	 supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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be dealt with in a swift and certain and severe manner . .," and that
they should be subject to "stricter, harsher, and more certain penal-
ties. . . ." 2Gi Likewise, the Florida preamble cites the legislature's con-
cern over the explosion of the juvenile gun culture in Florida and the
desire of Florida citizens to address this problem. 262 Not a word is said
of the need to reach and assist those youths amenable to counsel.'"
Thus, it seems clear that the Florida legislature placed greater impor-
tance on the needs of the public. 264
The punitive stance taken by the recent juvenile handgun posses-
sion bans is being heralded as a view of things to come. 26' Colorado's
new law, in particular, is hailed by some as a watershed.266 Indeed,
shortly after Colorado passed its state-of-the-art juvenile gun possession
package in September 1993, twenty-five states requested information
regarding its details.2"7 By the end of 1993, Arizona, Florida, North
Carolina, Utah and Virginia had enacted prohibitions on the possession
of guns by juveniles. 268 Nor does it appear that these will be the last. 262
Especially compelling is that of these recent laws, three were
enacted in western states where guns have traditionally been as much
a part of life as the open range itself, such that few would have
predicted the acceptance of youth gun control measures until only
recently. 2" Undoubtedly, these surprising reactions pose a clear indi-
cation of the magnitude of the fear that violent juvenile crime has
2" Fla. H.B. 91-C (Preamble to Committee Substitute for House Bill no. 91-C) (enacted)
(LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttext
202 Id.
263 See id.
264 See id; see also Fox, supra note 14, at 47-48.
265 May, supra note 8, at IA.
266 1d.
267 King, supra note 139, at A10.
2" See supra note 178 and accompanying text. Only the statutes enacted by Arizona and
Florida follow the lead of Colorado in providing mandatory punishments. See infra Table.
265 At the time of publication, many states were considering youth gun possession prohibi-
tions. See, e.g., Kan. H.R. 2663, 75th Legis., 2d Sess. (1994) (LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttext Database)
(would prohibit handgun possession by juveniles); Mass. 5.11, 179, 179th Gen. Ct., 1994 Reg. Sess.
(LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttcxt Database) (would require mandatory minimum incarceration of
one year for juvenile convicted of possessing firearm); Minn. S.B. 1919, 78th Legis. Sess., 1993-94
Rag. Sess. (LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttext Database) (would ban firearm possession by juveniles
convicted of violent crimes); Miss. H.B. 604, I 62d Leg., 1994 Reg. Sess. (LEXIS, Legis Library,
Sttext Database) (would prohibit handgun possession by juveniles); Mo. H.B. 1525, 87th Legis.
Assem., 2d Sess. (1994) (LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttext Database) (would prohibit youths younger
than seventeen from possessing concealable firearms); Tenn. H.B. 2152, 98th Gen. Assem. (1994)
(LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttext Database); see also NJ, A,B. 30, 206th Legis., 1st Sess. (1994) (LEXIS,
Legis Library, Sttext Database) (would provide mandatory penalties for juveniles adjudicated
delinquent for certain subsequent offenses of illegally possessing a firearm, which is already a
crime in New jersey).
279 Freeman tie, supra note 8, at AI. Florida, which passed a ban on juvenile possession of
firearms last November, is also a pro-gun enclave. Id.
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inflicted on the public psyche.27 ' Thus, it seems likely that states with-
out the apparently deep-rooted western attachment to firearms may
soon act to ban youths from possessing guns. This expectation is
bolstered by the fact that several non-western states are currently con-
sidering Colorado's measures in creating or modifying their own juve-
nile gun bans. 272 Additionally, many policy makers have been voicing
the need for Congress to get involved, and it appears that Congress
has not turned a deaf ear. 2"
It is possible that the punitive reaction to juveniles possessing guns
is part of a "renaissance of retribution" in the juvenile justice system
271 See, e.g., May, supra note 8, at IA (quoting Sarah Brady: "Let's face it. Colorado's a state
where people love their guns. But even there, they're so fed up with violence they want something
done."); Oppet, supra note 9, at I j (In Utah, where popular culture is such that a quarter of the
population hunt deer every year, a strong impetus was required to prompt both the state
legislature and Salt Lake City to enact tougher new juvenile gun laws).
277 See supra note 270.
273 Recently, the House of Representatives recognized that because the supply of guns inevi-
tably forces the character of gun control as an interstate issue, the states' attempts at a more
punitive stance on juvenile gun control require the uniformity achievable only through federal
action. See H.R. 3098, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (enacted, Nov. 20, 1993). The House found
that "Individual States and localities find it impossible to handle the problem by themselves; even
States and localities that have made a strong effort to prevent, detect, and punish crime find their
effort unavailing due in part to the failure or inability of other States and localities to take strong
measures." Id. Acting upon this recognition, the House passed H.R. 3098, prohibiting the
possession of handguns by persons younger than eighteen, and providing that convicted juveniles
will be fined, imprisoned I'm up to one year, or both, if convicted for handgun possession. Id. If
the offending youths have not previously been convicted under state or federal law of possessing
a handgun, the court must sentence them to probation, arid may not sentence them to incar-
ceration. Id. (this "Youth Handgun Safety Act of 1993" is still pending consideration by the Senate
Committee on the judiciary, S. 1087, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)). Hence, the bill is mild
compared to the Colorado legislation, but it is nonetheless a direct reflection of the growing
willingness to punish violent youths, rather than rehabilitate them in the traditional sense, in that
it favors increased punitive sanctions against repeat offenders. Perhaps as an indication of things
to come, H.R. 3098 includes a provision directing the Attorney General to study existing state
juvenile handgun legislation and develop a model law to be disseminated to state authorities. Id.
According to Senator Bitten of Delaware, it appears that Congress has accepted a punitive
philosophy: "There is a mood here that if someone came to the floor and said we should barb
wire the ankles of anyone who jaywalks, 1 think it would pass." Krauss, supra note 8, at Al. A
representative example is the amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, passed by the House of Representatives on November 19, 1993. See H.R. 3351, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill states that lilt is the sense of the Congress that States should
impose mandatory sentences [for juveniles] for crimes involving the use of a firearm or other
weapon on school property or within a 100-yard radius of school property." Id. If enacted by the
Senate, the amendment would provide authorization for "alternative methods of punishment"
for young offenders, aimed specifically at preventing crime and reducing recidivism. Id In
particular, it is directed at punishing "young offenders who can be punished more effectively in
an environment other than a traditional correctional facility." Id. The amendment has all the
earmarks of a deterrence-based, punish-for-punishment's-sake drive for accountability and cer-
tainty of punishment for young offenders.
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as it moves ideologically toward becoming a criminal court system. 274
Arguably, the juvenile rights granted by the United States Supreme
Court through In re Gault and its progeny were also responses to this
movement.275 But in spite of an increased acceptance of punitive phi-
losophy, the juvenile justice system has traditionally been, and should
continue to be, as much concerned with persuading "fence-sitters" to
stay on the proper side of the fence as it is with rehabilitating or
punishing youths who have already crossed over and into social devi-
ancy.276 Thus, the juvenile gun possession bans should not be inter-
preted as foreshadowing an abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal.
Rather, they embody society's recognition that the mere status of being
a child should not always exempt a youth from punishment.
It is important to recognize that none of the new statutes provid-
ing mandatory punishments for juvenile gun possessors are tanta-
mount to placing a youth in the criminal justice system, even upon
repeat offenses. 277 juveniles are still subject to the rehabilitative efforts
of the court, with the additional requirement that some mandatory
punishment be suffered.278 In other words, the statutes add punitive
measures to the system, but do not remove rehabilitative ones. 279 The
statutes merely reflect the pragmatic attitude that society has become
too accustomed to juvenile behavior that it should not tolerate, and
that some form of punishment should accompany counseling and
other treatments when youths commit violent offenses. 28°
Although authorizing grants to he used by states and localities to light juvenile crime, it likely
conditions the award of these monies on whether the state has enacted laws providing sanctions
for juveniles who possess firearms, or are convicted of crimes involving the use of a firearm on
school property, and which ban firearms in a 100-yard radius Of schools. See id. Specifically, the
amendment states that the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance "consider[s] as an
important factor" in awarding funds to states whether they have such laws or policies in effect.
throughout the state. Id.
274 See Gardner, supra note 7, at 135-37.
275 See supra notes 77-155 and accompanying text.
276 See Fox, supra note 14, at 19. Professor Fox appears to agree, asserting that suggestions
for turning the juvenile court into a mini-criminal court are unwise, in that for the majority of
the children being treated within the juvenile justice system a punitive approach is improper. Id.
277 See SUPra notes 190-230 and accompanying text.
278 Li
279 More precisely, the rehabilitative abilities of the juvenile court remain intact except to the
degree that merely introducing mandatory penalties to juvenile justice is repugnant to rehabili-
tative philosophy. See Skibinski, supra note 8, at 48 (key assumption of rehabilitative philosophy
is that only restorative treatment methods, and not punitive ones, can check criminal tendencies
before they harm society).
2s6
	 Remarks by President Bill Clinton at the Fund -Raiser for Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
FED. NEWS SERV., Dec. 13, 1993. ("We are getting used to a lot of behavior that is not good for
us.... We tolerate all kinds of things nobody else would put up with.").
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B. A Problem of Underirtclusion or Overinclusion
After acknowledging a place for punitive philosophy in the reha-
bilitative framework of the juvenile justice system, juvenile justice must
focus on the risks inherent in applying mandatory, and consequently
nonindividualized, penalties such as those employed by Arizona, Flor-
ida and Colorado. Particularly, the statutes risk overinclusiveness-
needlessly or excessively punishing fence-sitters in attempting to reach
the more hardened delinquents—or, conversely, underinclusiveness-
not providing meaningful penalties for the more hardened offenders
in an effort to avoid excessively punishing those youths merely in need
of a reminder. The basic difficulty arises from the inability to know
where to draw the line for either class.
As the watershed in youth gun possession statutes, Colorado's law
arguably strikes the balance, if at all, on the side of overinclusiveness.
This can be seen from the fact that although a mandatory period of
detention for a first-offender may seem appropriately symbolic for
deterring fence-sitters, a minor found with a gun may endure a total
of sixty-five days of detention, in a worst-case scenario, even though the
minor has no juvenile court record?'" On the other hand, a first-of-
fender with no significant record would probably be able to rebut the
presumption that they are a danger to society, thereby avoiding the
potential sixty-day pretrial detention. 282 Even so, it is apparent that in
its desire to provide for public safety considerations, the Colorado
legislature made a choice to risk incarcerating those who might not
deserve or require so harsh a reprimand, in order to avoid setting truly
dangerous youths free. 285
Ameliorating the effect of this choice, however, is the realization
that Colorado's statute incorporates a balance absolutely essential to
any youth gun ban aimed at inhibiting potential delinquents. Several
aspects of the ban illustrate this. First, although a first offender faces
a mandatory incarceration period of five days, the judge has discretion
to increase this period to up to forty-five days for first offenders with
unrelated violations on their records. 2" Where the judge deems appro-
priate, a juvenile may also be sentenced to a sixty-day boot camp. 285
2141




	 C010. H .B. 1001, 59th Gen. Assent., 1st Extraordinary Sess., Section 16 (1993) (WEST-
LAW, CO-ST-ANN Database) (enacted), hi fact, the Colorado legislature stated that "[L] he general
assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety." Id.
254 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
285 See supra note 225 and accompanying lexL
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Upon second or subsequent offenses, the juvenile court judge has the
discretion to utilize these possibilities, or to place the youth in an
out-of-home facility for treatment and guidance for up to two years.'"
Hence, the Colorado law appropriately balances the need to punctuate
the seriousness of a gun possession offense for a fence-sitter, with the
equally important goal of punishing and attempting the rehabilitation
of more serious offenders.
Unlike Colorado's provisions, the Florida possession ban appears
to take an underinclusive stance. Under the Florida statute a first-of-
fender endures a mandatory penalty of 100 hours of community serv-
ice. 287
 This seems to indicate that the Florida legislators were con-
cerned solely with fence-sitters, for there is no significant distinction
in punishment available for offenders with substantial prior records,
or with respect to subsequent offenses. But it is clear from the events
leading to the law's enactment, as well as from the legislative history,
that Florida citizens and legislators were concerned with far more
serious juvenile offenders. 288 The Florida ban, therefore, although ap-
propriate in its stance toward fence-sitters, is underinclusive in that it
does not provide the "stricter, harsher, and more certain penalties" that
the legislature intended for hardened youth offenders. 2"
Likewise, the Florida statute does not embody the intelligent bal-
ance employed by the Colorado law. That is, by merely increasing the
community service hours to 250 for a subsequent offender, the Florida
lawmakers did not draw the distinction which the Colorado drafters
seem to have made: that a second or subsequent offender is more than
a mere fence-sitter, and merits both a harsher penalty and a more
rigorous attempt at treatment. Thus, although the Florida law may
effectively deter some youths considering involvement with firearms,
the juveniles who are returned to court, having been unimpressed with
their first encounter, will find no significantly greater threat confront-
ing them. Similarly, youths charged with gun possession who already
have lengthy records, though not involving a gun possession convic-
tion, will experience the same sanctions borne by first-time juvenile de-
fendants. The Florida statute fails to achieve the appropriate balance.
The Arizona ban may demand scrutiny under a different lens. As
the state legislature asserted, it was not concerned with the overwhelm-
ing majority of youths who do not resort to violence with guns. 29° In
285 See supra note '227 and accompanying text.
287 See supra note 205 and accompanying text,
288 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
289 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
290 Aaiz. REV. STA•. ANN. § 13-3111 (Supp. 1993) (Historical and Statutory Notes). The
Arizona legislature stated that:
920	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 35:885
accordance with this, and in recognition of Arizona's tradition of
liberal gun possession rights, Arizona's juvenile gun possession prohi-
bition is relatively lenient on offenders, and may not be as underinclu-
sive as the resounding backdrop of public fear in America seems to
imply.291
 Nevertheless, the Arizona ban evinces a stark lack of balance,
in that it makes no distinction between first and subsequent offenses,
and contains no special provisions indicating a more serious stance
toward juveniles who have previously been adjudicated as delinquents,
and who are subsequently found guilty of possessing a gun. 292 The
result is that hardened juvenile offenders receive the same punishment
for possessing a firearm as first-offenders. 2"
For many, Colorado's approach is a long awaited step in the right
direction."' But others feel that even in Colorado, legislators have not
gone far enough. 2" Arguably, as punitive as the new youth gun bans
are, they will be largely ineffective without other provisions addressing
the issues of poverty, the exploitation of violence by the media, the
unchecked supply of guns flowing into the United States, and other
important social variables inextricable from the equation of youth
violence. This may very well be correct, but should not be used to
detract from the point that for many fence-sitters, a brief and indelible
experience with the coercive power of the legal system may sufficiently
inhibit future indiscretions.296
 To this end, punitive juvenile gun pos-
session bans are useful. In considering the adoption of these measures,
the most important guideline for state legislatures is that of proper
balance. In this sense, Colorado's new law provides an appropriate
The legislature finds that
1. The overwhelming majority of minors in this state who keep and bear arms do so
responsibly and in a law-abiding manner under the supervision of parents or guardians.
2. A minute number of juvenile offenders disproportionately threaten the public peace
through their unlawful use or threatening exhibition of deadly weapons or dangerous instru-
ments.
Id. (Historical and Statutory Notes at § 2(A) (1), (2)).
291 See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
29'3 Id.
294 See, e.g„ Barstow, supra note 6, at 1B. Where loopholes in the law once existed to allow
gun wielders to avoid arrest or even confiscation of their weapons, recent Florida and Colorado
laws at least provide the police the ability to disarm juveniles who might commit mayhem. Id.
295 See, e.g., May, supra note 8, at 1A. Colorado state senator, Paul Weissman shares the view
of many that "[a]ny kid that'll look you in the eye and shoot you dead isn't going to give a damn
about this new law ... ." Id.
296
 See Fox, supra note 14, at 19-20.
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model to be considered by states facing equivalent crises with the youth
gun culture.
VI. CONCLUSION
The juvenile justice system in America has from its inception been
directed toward the rehabilitation and treatment of wayward youths.
But as the United States Supreme Court has long recognized, the good
intentions of the "rehabilitative ideal" have not been realized. More-
over, youth violence has increased both in volume and seeming re-
morselessness. There is no doubt that the expanding youth gun culture
has driven the public into a heightened state of fear.
Accordingly, the reaction of policy makers has been one preoccu-
pied with increasing public safety. Indeed, the contemporary trend
accepts harsh sanctions for juveniles as a means of deterring their
violent behavior. This trend has been manifested in a recent wave of
juvenile gun possession bans employing mandatory penalties to curb
youths' desires to carry guns.
Mandatory penalties represent an important method of attacking
the demand side of the gun equation. That is, where the question is
how to persuade those youths who are still reachable that they want
nothing to do with the juvenile gun culture, statutes such as Colorado's
may embody a means by which to extinguish the desire for a gun.
Admittedly, the approach appears to be one of coercion and intimida-
tion. But whereas society has little ability to choose whether it is sub-
jected to the violent acts of our children, those children can choose
whether or not to handle guns. It is plausible that a spoonful of the
law's inherently coercive power will effect the proper choice for many
youths. Thus, public safety concerns may correctly place the punitive
balance on the side of overinclusion when, as was accomplished by the
Colorado legislature, the law circumspectly addresses both those youths
who may only need a reminder of what the law demands, and those
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